Le Cateau
*
Dates: 26 August 1914
*
Background: After two and a half
weeks of battling their way through Belgium -- past Liege, Brussels,
and Mons --
Imperial Germany's badly bruised First Army crossed into northern
France between
Valenciennes and Maubeuge. The Germans were intent on chasing down the
BEF's I. Corps under General Haig and II. Corps under Smith-Dorrien,
both of whom had been
forced to fight an almost continual rearguard action. In his relentless
zeal to
put a quick end to the BEF forces, First Army Commander Alexander von
Kluck,
ordered to encircle Paris to the west, had already allowed his troops
to drift
over 30 miles east of his intended route. Just north of Le Cateau, a
small town about 20 miles south of the Belgian border, the two British
corps came
upon the dense Forest of Mormal and fatefully allowed themselves to
become
separated to either side of the four mile wide forest. On the night of
25
August, as the rain poured down on his exhausted infantrymen,
Smith-Dorrien had
an unpleasant decision forced upon him: try to slip away from Kluck
before
sunlight, continuing the rearguard action, or turn and fight, possibly
buying
the retreating Allied Forces some precious time.
* The
Germans: Kluck had
some very able commanders fighting for him in generals Sixt von Armin
(IV.
Corps) and von Gronau (IV. Reserves), both units from Prussian Saxony.
In action
west of Le Cateau was von der Marwitz' three division strong 2nd Cav
Corps,
while von Lochow's III. Corps of Brandenburgers engaged Haig as he
retreated
south along the Sambre River.
|
First Army
|
Generaloberst Alexander
von Kluck
(CoS:
Generalmajor Hermann von Kuhl) |
|
III. Corps |
Gen.d.Inf. Ewald von
Lochow
5th Division: Genlt.
Georg Wichura
6th Division:
Genmaj. Herhudt von Rohden |
|
IV. Corps |
Gen.d.Inf. Friedrich
Sixt von Armin
7th
Division: Genlt. Johannes Riedel
8th Division:
Genmaj. Georg K.A. Hildebrandt |
|
IV. Reserves |
Gen.d.Inf. Hans von
Gronau
7th
Res.Division: Genlt. Bogislav Graf von Schwerin
8th Res.Division:
Genlt. Otto Riemann |
|
H.K.K. 2 |
Gen.d.Kav.
Georg von der Marwitz
2nd
Cav Division: Genmaj. Friedrich FH von Krane
(4th & 7th Jaeger Bns)
4th Cav Division:
Genlt. Otto von Garnier
9th Cav Division: Genmaj. Eberhard Graf von Schmettow
(3rd, 9th & 10th Jaeger Bns) |
* The
Battle: As Smith-Dorrien's
troops came stumbling into Le Cateau, BEF I. Corps had already met up
with
Lochow's Brandenburgers at Landrecies, just south of the Forest of
Mormal. There
was a fear that Kluck's forces would pierce through the gap between the
two BEF
corps, and Smith-Dorrien became convinced that it would be better for
his
forces, both psychologically and tactically, to turn and make a stand.
Kluck had
previously received air reconnaissance reports indicating that the BEF
was
retreating to the fortress town of Maubeuge, about 17 miles northeast
of Le
Cateau. From this, Kluck mistakenly believed he would be able to
encircle the
Brits at Maubeuge and then turn the French Sixth Army's left flank.
Further air
recon revealed, however, that the BEF was continuing its retreat
southward. As
First Army headquarters reissued orders to resume its chase, Belgian
elements
out of Antwerp began harassing strikes on German communications and
supply lines
located to the rear.
|
|
|
von Kluck
|
|
Most of
Kluck's forces were involved in efforts to outflank the BEF to the
west, an action which was ultimately unsuccessful as they met up with
elements of the French Sixth Army under Maunory. Linsingen's II. Corps
was also to outflank to the west but was halted by French forces under
d'Amade, never reaching Le Cateau at all. So, fortunately for
Smith-Dorrien, Kluck thus had only about three divisions worth of
troops involved in the main engagement at Le Cateau. General von Kluck
himself also remained far removed from the action.
The BEF
was attempting to hold about a ten mile section of open ground
stretching from Le Cateau and Cambrai. German artillery, emplaced on
the higher ground to the north, began pounding the exposed British
infantry and artillery batteries during the mist-filled early morning
hours of the 26th. There was speculation that the accuracy of the
German artillery was due to locational data being passed on from German
spies, but it was in fact more likely a result of information coming
from spotter aircraft. Only expert BEF marks- manship was able to hold
off the initial German infantry assaults as they tried to flank the
Brits' right flank along the Selle River valley around 8:00
am. BEF II. Corps commanders believed that Haig's I. Corps
forces were covering this flank, when in actuality they had continued
their retreat to the south.
|
German
artillery renewed the barrage at about
10:00 am, and at this point inflicted heavy losses, but German infantry
and
machine-gun companies were still able to make only little headway. Near
12:00
pm, Riedel's 7th Division came into contact with BEF 5th Division
elements who
were attempting to fall back with operational artillery pieces, and it
soon
became apparent that the BEF right wing was collapsing. By 3:00 pm,
Riedel had
completely surrounded the Suffolks Regiment and two companies of the
Argylls.
The Germans were able to capture about 25 field guns and one howitzer.
At this
point, II. Corps had already commenced a general retreat southward
toward BEF HQ
located at St. Quentin. Many BEF regiments, however, did not receive
the
retirement order and were subsequently overcome by the increasingly
rapid German
pursuit.
The
BEF's decision to turn and fight paid off
rather well for the Allies: it delayed the German swoop toward Paris
and
inflicted heavy casualties on Kluck's numerically superior First Army.
It also allowed the BEF's I.
Corps to escape a potential rout and gave them some much needed
breathing space.
The decision likewise drove an unfortunately
sharp and lasting wedge between BEF Commander-in-Chief French, who had
ordered a
continued southerly retreat, and Smith-Dorrien, who was subsequently
sacked for
his actions.
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