Stallupönen
and
Gumbinnen

* Dates:  17 August 1914 - Stallupönen
              20 August 1914 - Gumbinnen

* Background:  For Germany's "Von Schlieffen Plan" to succeed on the Western Front, Chief of General Staff Helmuth von Moltke and his advisors were counting on two primary factors falling into place in the eastern theater of operations: firstly, that the Russians would not be completely mobilized for up to three months, and secondly, if the invasion did occur, that the 80-mile natural barrier formed by the Masurian Lakes, along with the powerful fortifications near Königsberg (Kaliningrad), would allow von Prittwitz's Eighth Army to hold the Russians off until the French were defeated. 

At France's desperate urging, however, the Russians prematurely ordered its first and second armies to begin its advance into East Prussia on 13 August, well before logistical support was established and before their overall mobilization was even one-third complete. And, just as German intelligence expected would eventually happen, Rennenkampf's First Army moved west toward the Insterburg Gap, while Samsonov's Second Army attempted to circle around the Germans to the south, on a march through Poland. On 17 August, ready or not, Rennenkampf crossed the frontier near Stallupönen, initiating the war's first engagement on the Eastern Front. Three days later, the Russians and Germans once again squared off at Gumbinnen.

* The Battle of Stallupönen:  The Germans initially had at least three advantages in their favor: Rennenkampf's inexplicable tendency to not use his cavalry for reconnoitering German positions, the Russian practice of not encrypting communications, and probably most importantly, Rennenkampf and Samsonov's lack of cooperation due to an intense personal hatred of each other. Although these issues factored more heavily during the Tannenberg engagement, they also helped slow the initial Russian parry into East Prussia. Upon crossing the frontier on 17 August, elements of Rennenkampf's center (III. Corps) unexpectedly ran into the ready and waiting units of von François' forces near Stallupönen (present day Nesterov, Russia). The German counterattack pushed the advance Russian troops back toward the border with the loss of over 3,000 men. Although the Russian First Army was a confused mass of soldiers at this point, François was ordered to withdraw to Gumbinnen, about 25 km to the west, where the bulk of the Eighth Army was positioning itself defensively behind the Angerapp River. This allowed Rennenkampf's men to regroup, and on 18 August, they continued their westward advance to Insterburg (Chernachovsk). 

By 19 August, the Russians had passed by Stallupönen and were now approaching the town of Gumbinnen (present day Gusev, Russia). Although von Prittwitz was expecting the Russians to attack that next morning, on the night of the 19th, his listening posts intercepted Russian communications which revealed that Rennenkampf's forces were to stay put. Prittwitz became a bit nervous at this, given that the Russian Second Army was now supposedly crossing the border on their advance toward Allenstein (Olsztyn, Poland). General von François was thus able to convince Prittwitz that the Germans should take the attack to Rennenkampf.

* The Battle of Gumbinnen: On the morning of 20 August, von Prittwitz attacked with François'  I. Corps on the left, Mackensen's XVII. Corps in the center, and Otto von Below's I. Reserve Corps on the right. Von François boldly led his troops to crush the Russian XX. Corps, driving them almost back to Stallupönen with heavy losses. Mackensen's XVII. Corps, however, was repulsed by the Russian III. Corps, while von Below's I. Reserves fought to a draw with IV. Corps.

While mulling over the possibilities of resuming the attack, von Prittwitz received news that night that Samsonov was pressing on to Allenstein. Deeply fearful that the Eighth Army would be encircled, von Prittwitz, who owed his command more to his courtly connections than to his military skills (he was also the cousin of von Hindenburg's wife), completely lost his nerve and issued orders for an immediate retreat to the Vistula. When back in Koblenz, von Moltke was informed of the retreat and of von Prittwitz' desperate plea for additional troops, he decided to can his inept army commander and replace him with more reliable, steady-nerved leadership. His choice of course was to call out of retirement the rock-solid Paul von Hindenburg and match him up with the capable hero of Liege, Erich Ludendorff.

In the meantime, lieutenant colonel Max Hoffmann, serving as Eighth Army Chief of Operations, was able to convince von Prittwitz that the situation was truly not all that desperate. In fact, the Germans would not be able to withdraw to the Vistula without a heavy fight anyway, given that Samsonov was over 100 km closer to the river. Hoffmann thus proposed leaving a cavalry division at Gumbinnen in order to screen the slow-moving Rennenkampf, while I. Corps and the 3rd Reserve Infantry Division would move by rail to Allenstein, where they would join with XX. Corps and engage Samsonov. XVII. Corps and I. Reserves would also move west to Allenstein to assist in the attack. Meanwhile, Ludendorff was amazingly busying himself by drawing up the same basic plan (without consulting Hindenburg), and this was the groundwork for what would be the Battle of Tannenberg. Although von Prittwitz approved Hoffmann's plan change, no one thought to inform Supreme Command, and thereby sealed the doom of both Prittwitz' military career as well as the Schlieffen Plan.

* click to enlarge


home